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ABSTRACT 
This article conducts a comparative analysis of intermediary liability laws regarding 
harmful speech in nine liberal-democratic polities. Harmful speech here is defined 
in terms of the ability of user-generated content (“UGC”) to lead to individual phys-
ical harm (e.g., threats, incitement to violence), individual relational harm (e.g., def-
amation), or individual reactive harm (e.g., hate speech), as well as its potential to 
lead to social harm (e.g., fake news). The purpose of this comparative analysis is to 
distill a set of common principles upon which the concept of “platform ethics”—
ethical duties that digital intermediaries owe to their users and to society—can be 
based. Conceptualizing platform ethics is incredibly important today as major social 
networks remain indispensable tools for democracy despite waning public trust 
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In 2016, Americans realized that social media can be weaponized to spread 
disinformation among highly targeted groups of users and sow chaos and confusion 
of varying types and degrees.1 The locus of the fracas is on social media platforms, 
defined by media scholar Tarleton Gillespie as “sites and services that host public 
expression, store it on and serve it up from the cloud, organize access to it through 
search and recommendation, or install it onto mobile devices.”2 Trolls and provo-
cateurs continue to plague these platforms with speech that ranges from merely vile 
to outright abuse and harassment.3 Nevertheless, social media platforms remain a 
powerful tool for individuals to participate in a global public discourse and create 
change within their communities.4 So, does that mean that society must take the bad 
with the good when it comes to social media? Or do social media platforms owe us 
a bit more? 
In a 2017 article, I posed the question of whether social media platforms have 
a moral duty to prevent harm caused by the speech of others, promote freedom of 
expression, or some ideal combination of the two.5 Although I framed the first pos-
sible moral duty in that article in terms of harms directed against specific individu-
als, it is possible for this question to be applied more broadly to other types of harm-
ful content common in our world today: fake news, hate speech directed at a group 
of people, or speech glorifying terrorism. The issue of whether intermediaries might 
have a moral duty to promote freedom of expression is a tougher issue. Social net-
working platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube (among others) sell 
users on the promise of freedom of expression and the allure of fame that might 
come from a user’s content becoming widely popular (i.e., “going viral”), with the 
express purpose of commodifying and profiting off of users’ content.6 Accordingly, 
I have argued that these digital intermediaries have developed an “aggregational 
theory of freedom of expression”; primacy is placed on the capacity, magnitude, or 
                                                          
 1. See Eric Westervelt, How Russia Weaponized Social Media with ‘Social Bots’, NPR (Nov. 5, 
2017, 8:06 AM), https://www.npr.org/2017/11/05/562058208/how-russia-weaponized-social-media-
with-social-bots. 
 2. Tarleton Gillespie, Governance of and by Platforms, in SAGE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL MEDIA 
254 (Jean Burgess, Thomas Poell & Alice E. Marwick eds., 2017). 
 3. See Lee Rainie, Janna Anderson & Jonathan Albright, The Future of Free Speech, Trolls, Ano-
nymity and Fake News Online, PEW RES. CTR (Mar. 29, 2017), http://www.pewinter-
net.org/2017/03/29/the-future-of-free-speech-trolls-anonymity-and-fake-news-online/. 
 4. See, e.g., Taso G. Lagos, Ted M. Coopman & Jonathan Tomhave, “Parallel Poleis”: Towards a 
Theoretical Framework of the Modern Public Sphere, Civic Engagement and the Structural Advantages 
of the Internet to Foster and Maintain Parallel Socio-Political Institutions, 16 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 
398 (2014); Andrew J. Flanagin, Craig Flanagin & Jon Flanagin, Technical Code and the Social Con-
struction of the Internet, 12 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 179 (2010). 
 5. Brett G. Johnson, Speech, Harm, and the Duties of Digital Intermediaries: Conceptualizing Plat-
form Ethics, 32 J. MEDIA ETHICS 16 (2017) [hereinafter Speech, Harm and the Duties of Digital Inter-
mediaries]. 
 6. See, e.g., Louis Leung, User-Generated Content on the Internet: An Examination of Gratifica-
tions, Civic Engagement and Psychological Empowerment, 11 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 1327 (2009); Ute 
Schaedel & Michel Clement, Managing the Online Crowd: Motivations for Engagement in User-Gen-
erated Content, 7 J. MEDIA BUS. STUD. 17 (2010). Cf. Scott Wright, Politics as Usual? Revolution, 
Normalization and a New Agenda for Online Deliberation, 14 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 244 (2012). 
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potential of users to speak on platforms, and the quality or importance of that speech 
is overlooked.7 
The fact that social media platforms are global operations complicates the eth-
ical debate surrounding the promotion of free expression. In the United States’, so-
cial networks have a First Amendment right to manage users’ content as they please, 
and users are unable to make any constitutional claims against social networks for 
removing—some might say “censoring”—their speech.8 However, this does not 
mean that these intermediaries should shrug off any moral duty toward promoting 
and practicing the values of freedom of expression among its users. Certainly, 
scholars have argued that the promotion of freedom of expression is not inherently 
a moral duty, trending instead toward hedonism.9 However, by promoting and prac-
ticing the values of freedom of expression, digital intermediaries could act as a 
model for society to tolerate and critically engage with extreme and challenging 
ideas.10 Furthermore, since these intermediaries are borne out of the exceptional 
American ethos for freedom of expression, one could argue they have a moral ob-
ligation to promote an American vision of freedom of expression in their global 
operations, particularly in countries that repress this basic human right.11 However, 
one could just as easily argue that the privilege to operate globally requires social 
media companies to honor the social and cultural (to say nothing of legal) norms of 
the countries in which they do business.12 Therefore, understanding how the harms 
of speech are defined, categorized, weighted, and punished in various parts of the 
world is crucial for social media platforms to operate ethically across the globe. 
This article is as much about ethics as it is about law—as much about self-
regulation as it is about government-imposed regulation. Indeed, it is about the con-
nection between these poles; laws often can reflect the moral norms of the people 
that pass them.13 I propose the best way to distill any moral principles that can be 
applied to how social media platforms should govern harmful content is to examine 
the laws that mandate how social media platforms govern harmful content. I argue 
                                                          
 7. Brett G. Johnson, Facebook’s Free Speech Balancing Act: Corporate Social Responsibility and 
Norms of Online Discourse, 5 J. MEDIA L. & ETHICS 17 (2016) [hereinafter Facebook’s Free Speech 
Balancing Act]. 
 8. See, e.g., Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. AOL, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 436, 456 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (holding 
that AOL’s email service was not the “functional equivalent” to a public forum. In other words, AOL 
was not acting as an agent supplying a forum for communication that state actors would normally make 
available. The court also held that AOL, unlike cable systems, did not control the “critical pathway” of 
communication, and thus an individual did not have a valid claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that AOL was 
operating as a state actor in censoring his speech). 
 9. See Don E. Tomlinson, Where Morality and Law Diverge: Ethical Alternatives in the Soldier of 
Fortune Cases, 6 J. MASS MEDIA ETHICS 69 (1991). 
 10. See Brett G. Johnson, Networked Communication and the Reprise of Tolerance Theory: Civic 
Education for Extreme Speech and Private Governance Online, 50 FIRST AM. STUDIES 14 (2016). 
 11. Ethan Zuckerman, Intermediary Censorship, in ACCESS CONTROLLED: THE SHAPING OF 
POWER, RIGHTS, AND RULE IN CYBERSPACE 71, 82–83 (Ronald Deibert et al. eds., 2010). 
 12. See, e.g., Patrick L. Plaisance, The Mass Media as Discursive Network: Building on the Implica-
tions of Libertarian and Communitarian Claims for News Media Ethics Theory, 15 COMM. THEORY 292 
(2005) (arguing that libertarianism has little, if any, moral justification as an ethical framework); Michael 
Perkins, International Law and the Search for Universal Principles in Journalism Ethics, 17 J. MASS 
MEDIA ETHICS 193, 205 (2002) (arguing that “the Western orientation of human rights treaties and the 
concept of free expression they contain can become problematic.”). 
 13. Steven Shavell, Law Versus Morality as Regulators of Conduct, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 227, 
247 (2002). 
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that such an approach can reveal how various polities conceive of the ideal relation-
ship between platforms and their users. Therefore, this article conducts a compara-
tive analysis of intermediary liability laws from multiple countries.14 In particular, 
this study looks at liability in the context of user-generated content (“UGC”) that 
has the potential to cause harm to individuals, groups, or society at large.15 
Part II defines in greater detail what is meant by harms to individuals, groups, 
or society at large caused by UGC.16 However, because these harms are purpose-
fully broad, some exclusions must be made lest the focus of this analysis become 
muddied from the outset. 
First, laws dealing with vicarious intermediary liability in copyright infringe-
ment are excluded. Although copyright infringement is considered a moral harm 
against rights-holders in some countries,17 it is primarily recognized as a commer-
cial harm.18 Thus, intermediary liability vis-à-vis copyright infringement is not an 
area of law from which moral duties to prevent harms to individuals, groups, and 
society at large can be distilled through comparative analysis. 
Second, the distribution of images of child abuse (what is colloquially referred 
to as “child pornography”) is excluded from the analysis. This type of content con-
sists of contraband that is categorically classified as criminal across the globe, and 
a common feature of intermediary liability laws is that intermediaries are legally 
obligated to stanch the distribution of this material if they become aware of it.19 
Thus, this area of law leaves virtually no ability to compare and contrast nuanced 
legal, and therefore ethical, principles. 
Third, laws regulating the management of personal data are excluded. This area 
of law is incredibly vast and rapidly evolving, and numerous scholarly articles have 
focused on comparative studies of data protection laws, especially those pertaining 
to the notion of a “right to be forgotten.”20 Including this area of law within this 
comparative analysis would add little to our understanding of the role of digital 
intermediaries in data protection. Furthermore, a conceptual difference exists be-
tween these two harms: the type of harm resulting from mismanagement of personal                                                           
 14. A supranational polity (the European Union) is included among the countries examined. 
 15. User-generated content (“UGC”) is defined herein as any message or media product created in-
formally by individuals or groups vis-à-vis an online platform that facilitates such creation. See, e.g., 
Ramon Lobato, Julian Thomas & Dan Hunter, Histories of User-Generated Content: Between Formal 
and Informal Media Economies, 5 INT’L J. COMM. 899, 900 (2011). 
 16. See infra notes 28–88 and accompanying text. 
 17. See, e.g., Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Work art. 6bis (1), Sept. 28, 
1979, http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/treaties/text.jsp?file_id=283693 (“Independently of the author’s 
economic rights, and even after the transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim 
authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other de-
rogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.”). 
 18. RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 49 (1992). 
 19. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1) (2018) (providing that digital intermediaries will not have immun-
ity from liability for third-party content that violates federal laws prohibiting the distribution of images 
of sexual exploitation of children). 
 20. Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, 2014 E.C.R. I-
317, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=152065&doclang=EN 
(interpreting Directive 95/46/EC to hold that the “‘right to be forgotten’ . . . override[s] the legitimate 
interests of the operator of the search engine and the general interest in freedom of information.”). For 
more context on this issue, see, e.g., Jane E. Kirtley, “Misguided in Principle and Unworkable in Prac-
tice”: Time to Discard the Reporters Committee Doctrine of Practical Obscurity (and Its Evil Twin, the 
Right to Be Forgotten), 20 COMM. L. & POL’Y 91 (2015); Jeffrey Rosen, The Right to Be Forgotten, 64 
STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 88 (2012); Michael J. Kelly & David Satola, The Right to Be Forgotten, 2017 
U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (2017). 
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data derives from the more technical “internal” functions of intermediaries, which 
is distinct from the harms resulting from “externally” viewed third party content.21 
The article proceeds as follows. First, Part II provides a brief discussion on the 
nature of harmful speech. In particular, this discussion relies on Professor Rodney 
Smolla’s three-part model of harmful speech, which identifies “physical harm, re-
lational harm, and reactive harm.”22 This discussion is important because it estab-
lishes an even playing field for analyzing how harm is conceptualized in various 
parts of the world while also making important distinctions between foreign con-
ceptions of harm and harm as conceived by First Amendment jurisprudence. 
Next, Part III conducts a comparative analysis. The analysis draws upon stat-
utes, directives, case law, and secondary scholarship to identify broad-level princi-
ples upon which countries’ laws of intermediary liability are constructed. The poli-
ties whose laws are analyzed are the United States, the European Union, the United 
Kingdom, Australia, Brazil, India, Japan, South Korea, and South Africa. Countries 
were selected due to their geographic diversity and position as powerful liberal-
democratic polities, and because their populations account for nearly 1.4 billion In-
ternet users as of 2016.23 Although more than 800 million Internet users live in ma-
jor global powers such as China and Russia,24 these countries are excluded due to 
their autocratic systems of government, reflected (particularly in China) in strict and 
sophisticated state censorship of much of the social Internet.25                                                           
 21. See Orin S. Kerr, The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law, 91 GEO. L. J. 357 (2003) (distin-
guishing two conceptions of the Internet: an internal one involving the technical details that happen 
behind the scenes, and an external one that users experience in the physical world). 
 22. SMOLLA, supra note 18, at 48. See infra notes 28–88. 
 23. Statistics for population estimates for individual countries (for 2017) come from CIA World 
Factbook country profiles. The World Factbook, CIA (2017), https://www.cia.gov/library/publica-
tions/the-world-factbook/; Statistics for percentage of Internet users in individual countries come from: 
Individuals Using the Internet: (% of population, WORLD BANK (2016), https://data.worldbank.org/in-
dicator/IT.NET.USER.ZS?name_desc=false; Statistics for population estimate for the European Union 
(for 2017) come from official EU statistics. Living in the EU, EUROPEAN UNION (2017), https://eu-
ropa.eu/european-union/about-eu/figures/living_en#tab-1-3; Statistics for percentage of Internet users in 
the European Union come from official EU statistics. Internet access and use statistics - households and 
individuals, EUROSTAT (2016), https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Ar-
chive:Internet_access_and_use_statistics_-_households_and_individuals. 
Country Population Internet % Internet Users 
Australia 23,232,413 88% 20,444,523.44 
Brazil 207,353,391 60 124,412,034.6 
EU (minus UK)  442,802,756 82 363,098,259.9 
India 1,281,935,911 30 384,580,773.3 
Japan 126,451,398 92 116,335,286.2 
South Africa 54,841,552 54 29,614,438.08 
South Korea 51,181,299 93 47,598,608.07 
UK 65,648,100 95 62,365,695 
USA 326,625,791 76 248,235,601.2 
Total 2,580,072,611 74% 1,396,685,220 
Estimates of country population and number of Internet users according to 2016-2017 data. 
(Table compiled by Brett G. Johnson). 
 24. Statistics for populations estimates for Russia and China come from the CIA World Factbook. 
CIA, supra note 23. Statistics for percentage of Internet users in Russia and China come from WORLD 
BANK, supra note 23. 
 25. See Jonathan Zittrain & John Palfrey, Internet Filtering: The Politics and Mechanisms of Control, 
in ACCESS CONTROLLED: THE SHAPING OF POWER, RIGHTS, AND RULE IN CYBERSPACE 29, 33 
(Ronald Deibert et al. eds., 2010) (Noting that “China . . . bundles Internet content restrictions with its 
copyright laws. This set of regulations sets a daunting web of requirements in front of anyone who might 
access the Internet or provide a service to another Internet user. These rules create a pretext that can be 
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Finally, Part IV synthesizes the comparative analysis to further identify broad 
ethical norms by which social media companies should operate. The purpose of this 
analysis is to compare and contrast legal philosophies for regulating social network-
ing companies so that broad ethical principles may be identified and presented as a 
way in which these companies might self-regulate. This analysis is important be-
cause users, politicians, and jurists are wising to the banes and boons that social 
media companies bring to society. Social and political pressure is mounting on pub-
lic officials to do something to mitigate the harms facilitated by digital intermedi-
aries.26 Meanwhile, digital intermediaries remain an indispensable part of our daily 
lives, and there is no indication that trend will change anytime soon.27 It is in the 
best interest of intermediaries and the public that the former adopt ethical principles 
with which to self-regulate and mitigate harms that could befall both individuals 
and democracy. 
The goal of this comparative analysis is to arrive at a set of principles upon 
which social media platforms should act to balance the competing interests of the 
promotion of political speech, to prevent harms to users, and to ensure the stable 
financial health of the platforms themselves. A comparative analysis is ideal for 
achieving this end because the legal contours separating the advancement of one or 
some of these competing interests over others can be examined in relation to similar 
and differing contexts. The principles of platform ethics put forth at the end of this 
analysis are based on an assessment of these contours and which interests they seek 
to privilege most. Furthermore, these ethical principles can temper the more ex-
treme models of intermediary liability laws, both those that impose a heavy burden 
on platforms to manage UGC (such as in Brazil and the EU) and the more libertarian 
model found in the United States. This article concludes with some thoughts on 
what reforms to these laws might look like based on the principles of platform eth-
ics. 
II. HARMS RESULTING FROM SPEECH 
The criteria this analysis uses to define harm in the context of intermediary 
liability laws come from a three-part model of harms that speech can cause, devised 
by Professor and First Amendment scholar Rodney Smolla: “physical harm, rela-
tional harm, and reactive harm.”28 The purpose of using Smolla’s model is to lay a 
foundation for comparative analysis by first discussing how harm is defined within 
First Amendment jurisprudence. This method does not necessarily mean First 
                                                          
used to punish those who exchange undesirable content, even though the law may not be invoked in 
many instances it might cover.”); Emily Parker, Russia Is Trying to Copy China’s Approach to Internet 
Censorship, SLATE (Apr. 4, 2017, 1:25 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/fu-
ture_tense/2017/04/russia_is_trying_to_copy_china_s_internet_censorship.html. 
 26. See Bill Allison, Facebook, Google Could Face Tighter Rules on Political Ads, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 
15, 2018, 7:44 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-02-16/facebook-google-could-
face-stricter-rules-on-political-ads. 
 27. Lee Rainie & Janna Anderson, The Fate of Online Trust in the Next Decade, PEW RES. CTR. 
(Aug. 10, 2017), http://www.pewinternet.org/2017/08/10/the-fate-of-online-trust-in-the-next-decade/ 
(“Many experts say lack of trust will not be a barrier to increased public reliance on the internet. Those 
who are hopeful that trust will grow expect technical and regulatory change will combat users’ concerns 
about security and privacy. Those who have doubts about progress say people are inured to risk, addicted 
to convenience and will not be offered alternatives to online interaction.”). 
 28. SMOLLA, supra note 18, at 48. 
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Amendment standards should be the benchmark by which the harms of speech 
should be judged around the world. Rather, this foundation is useful in its ability to 
draw baseline principles by which many different definitions and categories of harm 
can be understood worldwide. Furthermore, these principles can be synthesized to 
define new types of harm that social media platforms can facilitate, such as the 
societal-level harms that can arise from the proliferation of so-called “fake news.” 
A. Physical Harm 
United States free speech jurisprudence considers physical harm the worst of 
the three types of potential harms caused by speech.29 In the exceptional ethos of 
free speech in the United States, the capacity of speech to cause physical harm is 
one area where somewhat clear exceptions have been devised to demarcate when 
speech falls outside of constitutional protection. Such outlawed speech includes 
fighting words, incitement to imminent lawless action, and true threats. 
The fighting words doctrine comes from the 1942 case Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire.30 In that case, Chaplinsky, a Jehovah’s Witness, was arrested and con-
victed for violating a state breach of peace statute after calling a city marshal “a 
God damned racketeer and a damned Fascist.”31 The Supreme Court upheld Chap-
linsky’s conviction, and in so doing crafted the First Amendment exception for 
fighting words, which the Court defined as words said in another person’s face that 
“by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the 
peace.”32 
The incitement to imminent lawless action standard in First Amendment doc-
trine was refined in the 1969 case Brandenburg v. Ohio.33 That case involved a Ku 
Klux Klan member, Brandenburg, who was convicted under an Ohio criminal syn-
dicalism law for speaking racist messages to a frenzied crowd.34 The law prohibited 
“advocat[ing] . . . the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or 
unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political 
reform.”35 In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court reversed Brandenburg’s con-
viction, holding the following: 
the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a 
State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation 
except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent 
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.36 
                                                          
 29. David A. Anderson, Incitement and Tort Law, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 957, 959 (2002) 
(“[P]hysical harm . . . seems to present a stronger First Amendment claim than many other types of harm 
whose ability to trump speech interests is rarely questioned.”). 
 30. 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
 31. Id. at 569. 
 32. Id. at 572–73. 
 33. 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
 34. Id. at 444–45. 
 35. Id. at 445. 
 36. Id. at 447 (emphasis added). 
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The imminent lawless action standard narrowed the definition of unlawful in-
citement from the “bad tendency”37 and “clear and present danger”38 standards cited 
by the Court earlier in the twentieth century. 
The present doctrinal state of the true threat exception to the First Amendment 
is somewhat muddled. Generally speaking, United States Courts of Appeal have 
adopted a “reasonable person” standard for determining whether a threatening state-
ment loses First Amendment protection.39 However, the United States Supreme 
Court signaled a possible preference for an alternative test in Virginia v. Black, in 
which the Court held a Virginia statute criminalizing cross burning was unconstitu-
tionally overbroad.40 Justice O’Connor wrote in a plurality opinion that to convict 
a person of issuing a true threat, a state must consider whether the “speaker means 
to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful vio-
lence to a particular individual or group of individuals.”41 In a 2015 case involving 
threatening speech posted to Facebook, the Court sidestepped the doctrinal issue of 
whether the speaker’s intent needed to be taken into account for the speech to be 
considered a true threat.42 
In sum, these three doctrines—fighting words, incitement, and true threats—
separate the worst of speech-related harms from the body of protected speech in the 
United States. Physical harm is recognized as the worst possible harm caused by 
speech because it is direct, immediate, measurable, and often irreparable.43 As 
Smolla puts it, “[c]rimes must have victims . . . and the victimization must be pal-
pable, something beyond generalized disgust or disquiet over another’s conduct.”44 
However, the Court also recognizes speech may indeed best serve its high purpose 
when it induces a “condition of unrest,” creates dissatisfaction with conditions as 
they are, or even “stirs people to anger,”45 and therefore such speech needs “breath-
ing space” through expansive legal protections to exist despite the potential physical 
harms it could trigger.46 
B. Relational Harm 
Relational harm, according to Smolla, involves speech that causes injury to 
social relationships (e.g., defamation), business relationships (e.g., fraud or false 
advertising), ownership interests (e.g., copyright), and confidentiality (e.g., leaking 
                                                          
 37. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Abrams 
v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
 38. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949). 
 39. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 290 
F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 40. 538 U.S. 343, 363 (2003). 
 41. Id. at 359 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion). 
 42. Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2013 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting) (lamenting that the 
Court did not settle the matter of whether the petitioner’s speech amounted to a true threat). 
 43. See Clay Calvert, Hate Speech and Its Harms: A Communication Theory Perspective, 47 J. 
COMM. 4, 6–9 (1997) (distinguishing the direct, measurable and immediate nature of physical harms of 
speech from longer term mental and emotional harms associated with hostile environments created by 
speech). 
 44. SMOLLA, supra note 18, at 10. 
 45. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949). 
 46. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963) (holding that “First Amendment freedoms need 
‘breathing space’ to survive.”). 
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national security secrets).47 This section focuses only on jurisprudence regarding 
harms caused by defamation due to the close relationship between defamation and 
Smolla’s third category of reactive harms,48 and due to the fact that defamation 
plays a major role in shaping the contours of intermediary liability laws around the 
world. 
The United States Supreme Court constitutionalized defamation law in New 
York Times v. Sullivan by requiring public-official plaintiffs to prove that libelous 
statements about them were made with “actual malice”—the “knowledge that [the 
statement] was false or [made] with reckless disregard of whether it was false or 
not.”49 The same philosophy extends to public figures—those “who are not public 
officials, but [are] involved in issues in which the public has a justified and im-
portant interest,”50 thereby making them subject to public scrutiny. However, pri-
vate individuals are generally afforded greater leeway in pursuing defamation 
suits.51 
Smolla categorizes defamation as a relational harm due to its close similarity 
to other business-related harms, such as copyright infringement—it is a harm 
against property rights.52 Constitutional scholar Robert Post argues that defamation 
law in the United States is built on the metaphor that “reputation is capital.”53 Rep-
utation is the fruit “of one’s own endeavors.”54 Reputation works hand-in-hand with 
American capitalism; it can be spent or invested to build up one’s fortune, which, 
in turn, can be invested back into one’s good reputation.55 Post argues that in the 
United States, the “purpose of the law of defamation is to protect individuals within 
the market by ensuring that their reputation is not wrongfully deprived of its proper 
market value.”56 
However, in many cultures, reputation is viewed as an immutable characteristic 
that is inextricably linked to an individual’s sense of honor.57 Post defines the notion 
of reputation-as-honor as “a form of reputation in which an individual personally 
identifies with the normative characteristics of a particular social role and in return 
personally receives from others the regard and estimation that society accords to 
that role.”58 This definition of reputation best fits a stratified, hierarchical, or “def-
erence” society rather than a society founded predominantly on market capitalism, 
such as the United States.59 Reputation as property is a flexible concept whereby a 
person can rebuild lost reputation exactly as she would recuperate a lost fortune:                                                           
 47. SMOLLA, supra note 18, at 48. 
 48. See infra notes 61–72. 
 49. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964). 
 50. Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 134 (1967). 
 51. Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 343 (1974) (holding that “the state interest in compensating injury 
to the reputation of private individuals requires that a different rule [other than actual malice] should 
obtain with respect to them.”). 
 52. SMOLLA, supra note 18, at 50. 
 53. Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution, 74 
CAL. L. REV. 691, 693 (1986). 
 54. Id. at 694 (internal quotations omitted). 
 55. Id. at 695. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 699. See also Brodwyn Fischer, Slandering Citizens: Insults, Class, and Social Legitimacy 
in Rio de Janeiro’s Criminal Courts, in HONOR, STATUS, AND LAW IN MODERN LATIN AMERICA 
(Sueann Caulfield, Sarah C. Chambers & Lara Putnam, eds., 2005). 
 58. Post, supra note 53, at 699–700. See also Peter F. Carter-Ruck, Comparative Defamation Law, 6 
INT’L LEGAL PRAC. 3, 6 (1981). 
 59. Post, supra note 53, at 702. 
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through an entrepreneurial zeal and sound navigation of the market.60 Honor, how-
ever, is a fixed concept, because the “value of honor is the value of a meaningful 
life.”61 In other words, viewing reputation as honor is more crucially tied to an in-
dividual’s identity than when reputation is viewed as property. Thus, one can argue 
the stakes are higher for protecting reputation as honor than they are for protecting 
reputation as property. 
Post’s distinct metaphors for reputation show how defamation straddles the line 
between relational harm and reactive harm when viewed in a global context. In the 
United States, defamation jurisprudence has moved away from the doctrine of 
group defamation (particularly against a racial group) that was once outlawed in 
Beauharnais v. Illinois,62 and toward a more reputation-as-capital conception of 
defamation.63 Meanwhile, in other countries, the link between defamation and rac-
ism, which Smolla defines as a reactive harm, is much closer. For example, Article 
5 of the Brazilian constitution enshrines a right to honor and reputation as well as a 
right to be free from racism,64 which Brazilian law views as a crime against honor 
and dignity.65 
C. Reactive Harm 
Smolla’s third category, reactive harm, includes intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, tortious invasions of privacy, and any type of hate speech.66 The 
Supreme Court has raised the standards for plaintiffs suing under the first two cat-
egories by imputing the actual malice standard from Sullivan into many of these 
torts, due in large part to their similarity to the tort of defamation.67 Hate speech has 
been defined many different ways by many different scholars, but a generic defini-
tion for the purposes of this study categorizes hate speech as any speech that attacks 
and attempts to subordinate any group or class of people, typically spoken by a 
group with a higher level of social power than the targets of the speech.68 The targets                                                           
 60. Id. at 695. 
 61. Id. at 701. 
 62. 343 U.S. 250 (1952). 
 63. Post, supra note 53, at 695. 
 64. C.F. art. 5 (Braz.) (English version), http://english.tse.jus.br/arquivos/federal-constitution. 
 65. Lei No. 12.288, de 20 de Julho de 2010, PRESIDÊNCIA DA REPÚBLICA (Braz.) (Statute of Racial 
Equality), http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2007-2010/2010/Lei/L12288.htm. 
 66. SMOLLA, supra note 18, at 50. 
 67. Cantrell v. Forest City Publ’g Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974) (holding that plaintiffs must prove actual 
malice to successfully recover for the tort of false light invasion of privacy); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. 
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (holding that a public figure plaintiff must prove actual malice to success-
fully recover for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress). 
 68. See Calvert, supra note 43, at 4 (showing various studies with various definitions of hate speech); 
Alexander Tsesis, Dignity and Speech: The Regulation of Hate Speech in a Democracy, 44 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 497, 504 (2009); Richard Delgado & David H. Yun, Essay II. Pressure Valves and 
Bloodied Chickens: An Analysis of Paternalistic Objections to Hate Speech Regulation, 82 CAL. L. REV. 
871, 878-79 (1994); Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court and the Problem of Hate Speech, 24 CAP. U. L. 
REV. 281, 290 (1995); Stephanie Farrior, Molding the Matrix: The Historical and Theoretical Founda-
tions of International Law Concerning Hate Speech, 14 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 1 (1996); Jean-Marie 
Kamatali, The U.S. First Amendment Versus Freedom of Expression in Other Liberal Democracies and 
How Each Influenced the Development of International Law on Hate Speech, 36 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 721, 
728 (2010); Robert Post, Hate Speech, in EXTREME SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY 123 (Ivan Hare & James 
Weinstein eds., 2009) [hereinafter Hate Speech]; Tanya Katerí Hernández, Hate Speech and the Lan-
guage of Racism in Latin America: A Lens for Reconsidering Global Hate Speech Restrictions and Leg-
islation Models, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 805, 807–809 (2011). 
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of such speech typically include racial minorities, women, religious minorities, and 
the LGBTQ community.69 Generally, hate speech is only punishable if it contra-
venes one of the few First Amendment exceptions listed above.70 According to 
Smolla, speech that leads to reactive harms deserves the highest level of constitu-
tional protection due to its tendency to implicate public figures or officials, or its 
tendency to involve important social issues and matters of public concern—factors 
which greatly outweigh the potential harms of the speech.71 
However, other scholars view the reactive harms of hate speech in a more nu-
anced way in an attempt to craft sound First Amendment doctrine for mitigating 
such harms. Professor Cass Sunstein concedes “the line is sometimes thin between 
restrictions based on ‘harm’ and restrictions based on viewpoint of content.”72 How-
ever, he holds that the primary factor that should determine whether speech is pro-
tected “is whether the speech is a contribution to social deliberation, not whether it 
has political effects or sources.”73 Thus, Sunstein distinguishes a misogynist tract 
from pornographic movies, a racist speech to a crowd from face-to-face racial har-
assment, and a “tract in favor of white supremacy from a racial epithet.”74 
However, Sunstein points out that even within each of those categories, not all 
hateful words are equal in their potential to cause reactive harm. He writes, “[i]t is 
obtuseness—a failure of perception or empathetic identification—that would enable 
someone to say that the word ‘fascist’ or ‘pig’ or even ‘honky’ produces the same 
feelings as the word ‘nigger.’”75 A deeper moral point can be made from Sunstein’s 
argument: although the many examples of extreme speech listed above receive 
strong legal protection due to their theoretical social value, their harms are no less 
real to the people who suffer them. 
Nevertheless, in First Amendment jurisprudence, reactive harms are consid-
ered the least worrisome of harms caused by speech because they are generally con-
sidered less tangible than physical or relational harms.76 These latter two categories 
implicate life and property, while reactive harms can be reduced to “hurt feelings.”77 
                                                          
 69. See Hate Speech, supra note 68. 
 70. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) (holding that a St. Paul, Minn. ordinance 
banning symbolic speech (such as cross-burning) that is hateful “on the basis of race, color, creed, reli-
gion or gender”—a content-based restriction of speech—was unconstitutionally under-inclusive); Nat’l 
Socialist Party of Am. v. Vill. of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977) (holding that delays in issuing parade 
permits to Nazis were, in and of themselves, a content-based restriction on the Nazi Party’s speech); 
Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011) (holding that allowing an individual, even a private citizen such 
as Mr. Snyder, to sue for civil damages from emotional distress intentionally inflicted by lawful social 
speech would lead to a chilling effect on such speech). 
 71. SMOLLA, supra note 18, at 48. 
 72. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 174 (1993). 
 73. Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHICAGO L. REV. 255, 309 (1992). 
 74. Id. 
 75. SUNSTEIN, supra note 72, at 186. 
 76. C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 998 
(1978). 
 77. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 53–55 (1988): 
[I]n the world of debate about public affairs, many things done with motives that are less than 
admirable are protected by the First Amendment . . . . ‘Outrageousness’ in the area of political and 
social discourse has an inherent subjectiveness about it which would allow a jury to impose liability 
on the basis of the jurors’ tastes or views, or perhaps on the basis of their dislike of a particular 
expression. An ‘outrageousness’ standard thus runs afoul of our longstanding refusal to allow dam-
ages to be awarded because the speech in question may have an adverse emotional impact on the 
audience. 
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Certainly, harm to one’s mental well-being is nothing trivial. Many scholars who 
have proposed ideas for stronger regulations against hate speech point out that the 
damage such speech causes to the well-being of minorities leads to physical (hence, 
more important) ailments, such as anxiety and depression, which in turn may make 
minorities retreat from participating in society.78 However, the inability to create a 
legal test that would show a “direct causal link”79 between speech and mental harms 
(like with true threats, incitement, or actual malice) weighs against Smolla’s argu-
ment that speech associated with reactive harms often implicates public officials. 
This makes speech that causes reactive harms the least deserving of an exception 
from First Amendment protection. 
D.  Harms and Online Speech in a Global         
Communication Environment 
The three types of harm discussed above reflect the United States’ model for 
categorizing and, in some cases, justifying proscription of harmful speech. In sum, 
in the United States, unprotected speech must combine a lack of a significant mes-
sage with the likelihood that some form of harm will befall a targeted recipient.80 
For reactive harms, the task of justifying proscription of speech is difficult.81 Here, 
Smolla puts forth his “emotion principle,” which claims speech has both emotional 
and intellectual effects.82 Under the emotion principle, speech cannot be banned due 
to its emotional component alone; the intellectual component must be factored in, 
and even the slightest intellectual value will tip the scale in favor of protecting the 
speech.83 Thus, banning speech to prevent harm “may not be satisfied by the outrage 
or moral opprobrium that a majority of the populace attaches to the activity.”84 
Meanwhile, other countries’ legal systems do not package the harms of speech 
so neatly into physical, commercial, or emotional categories. For instance, the laws 
of some countries view hateful speech as more closely linked to physical harm than 
reactive harm. In Brazil, racist speech is criminalized, due in large part to the chal-
lenge racism poses to Brazil’s founding narrative that the country is a “racial de-
mocracy.”85 Similarly, in the European Union, the experience of Nazism and the 
                                                          
(emphasis added). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j (AM. LAW. INST. 
1965) (“[S]ome degree of transient and trivial emotional distress is a part of the price of living among 
people.”). 
 78. Calvert, supra note 43; see also, Caroline West, Words the Silence? Freedom of Expression and 
Racist Hate Speech, in SPEECH & HARM: CONTROVERSIES OVER FREE SPEECH 222 (Ishani Maitra & 
Mary Kate McGowan eds., 2012). 
 79. Clay Calvert, Kara Carnley, Brittany Link & Linda Riedmann, Conversion Therapy and Free 
Speech: A Doctrinal and Theoretical First Amendment Analysis, 20 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 
525, 539 (2014). 
 80. Frederick Schauer, Intentions, Conventions, and the First Amendment: The Case of Cross-Burn-
ing, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 197, 205 (2003). 
 81. SMOLLA, supra note 18, at 51. 
 82. Id. at 46. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 10. 
 85. See Brett G. Johnson, Prejudice Against Being Prejudiced: Racist Speech and the Specter of Se-
ditious Libel in Brazil, 20 COMM. L. & POL’Y 55 (2015) [hereinafter Prejudice Against Being Preju-
diced]. 
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Holocaust is among the reasons why racist speech is prohibited.86 These countries 
also tend to define racist speech in terms of its ability to incite racial hatred and 
violence, thereby threatening to throw society into chaos.87 
In the area of relational harm, Professor Robert Post argues that the prevailing 
interpretation in the United States is that reputation is similar to capital, whereby a 
bankrupt reputation, just like one’s lost fortune, has the potential to be rebuilt.88 
Such an interpretation is one factor behind the exceptional freedoms given to pub-
lishers to prevail in defamation lawsuits against public figures.89 However, Post 
contends that countries with cultural interpretations of reputation as a reflection of 
a person’s honor tend to have stricter laws governing defamation due to the notion 
that one’s honor is irreplaceable if damaged.90 In other words, harm to reputation is 
as irreparable as harm to one’s physical self. 
Smolla’s clean lines distinguishing the harms of speech are becoming further 
strained, if not outright blurred, due to the new and augmented types of harms per-
petuated by speech in our networked communication environment. The Internet’s 
facilitation of anonymous speech has lowered the social cost for speakers to inflict 
all sorts of harm through their online words.91 The reach, permanence, and anonym-
ity of Internet communication have the potential to amplify the physical, relational, 
and reactive harms associated with speech.92 Law professor Kent Greenawalt iden-
tifies four parts to the incitement standard: (1) the extent of the lawlessness of the 
action the speech is advocating; (2) who the speech is being directed at; (3) the 
likelihood of the action occurring; and (4) the imminence of the action occurring.93 
Each of these factors provides a layer of protection to speech that has the potential 
to lead to physical harm. 
However, networked communication can allow some types of extreme speech 
to surpass each of these protective layers. For example, the requirement that the 
communication be directed immediately at an angry audience may no longer be a 
sufficient condition for the incited lawless action to be imminent. Professor Lyrissa 
Lidsky argues that an inflammatory message posted on social media can target both 
intended and unintended audiences who may be more likely than a restive mob to 
imminently commit a violent illegal act.94 Others, however, argue the very idea that 
almost any controversial or offensive message could be suppressed because of its 
tendency to incite someone to violence should galvanize society to maintain its 
                                                          
 86. See Frederick Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment, in AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS 29, 42–43 (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005) (suggesting that the experience of the Holocaust 
may explain European legal perspectives toward hate speech). 
 87. JACOB ROWBOTTOM, Extreme Speech and the Democratic Functions of the Mass Media, in 
EXTREME SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY 608, 610 (Ivan Hare & James Weinstein eds., 2009); Hernández, 
supra note 68, at 827; Prejudice Against Being Prejudiced, supra note 85. 
 88. Post, supra note 53, at 702. 
 89. See id. at 695. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Incendiary Speech and Social Media, 44 TEXAS TECH L. REV. 147, 
149 (2011). See generally, DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE (2014); Mary 
Anne Franks, Unwilling Avatars: Idealism and Discrimination in Cyberspace, 20 COLUM. J. GENDER 
& L. 224 (2011); Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 86 B.U. L. REV. 61 (2009); Yuval Karniel, 
Defamation on the Internet—A New Approach to Libel in Cyberspace, 2 J. INT’L MEDIA & ENTM’T L. 
215 (2009). 
 92. See Lidsky, supra note 91; see also Franks, supra note 91, at 228. 
 93. Kent Greenawalt, Speech and Crime, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 645, 653 (1980). 
 94. Lidsky, supra note 91, at 149. 
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standard of only outlawing the rare case of directly inciting imminent lawless ac-
tion, online or off.95 The issue of terrorist propaganda presents a thorny dilemma 
for this debate. At its very core, such content could be considered political speech—
no different than the speech of other extremist groups advocating for death, destruc-
tion, and the overthrow of government. Yet such speech could also prove very suc-
cessful in recruiting disaffected youths to become terrorists, thereby indirectly in-
citing violence. 
Meanwhile, networked communication has seen the generation of new catego-
ries of harmful speech, such as “revenge porn,” which involves posting nude images 
online of an ex-romantic partner out of spite, and “cyber-harassment,” which in-
volves persistently inflicting substantial emotional distress against an individual 
through online communications.96 Indeed, in a networked communication environ-
ment, the reactive harms associated with hate speech have the potential to morph 
into physical harms when they take the form of cyber-harassment or abuse of an 
individual.97 Despite this rise in the level of harm, few if any legal options exist for 
targets of such invectives, shifting the focus from pie-in-the-sky legal remedies to 
calling on digital intermediaries to mitigate these harms through self-regulation and 
tech-based fixes.98 
It is important to unpack this dilemma as it is central to the analysis of this 
article. Digital intermediaries must abide by the laws of other countries and the var-
ious ways in which they define the harms of speech, both in general and in an online 
context.99 So, how do such platforms balance the goal of self-regulation with fol-
lowing the many laws set out before them? Scholars Jack Goldsmith and Tim Wu 
have suggested the best way to achieve this balance is to create a bordered Internet 
where unlawful content can be policed automatically using geolocation.100 How-
ever, such a policy neglects the harms of online speech in a country like the United 
States where, as will be discussed next, protections against intermediary liability 
are very strong. Moreover, it raises the specter of whether lawful and significant 
political speech in certain parts of the world could get caught up in the dragnet of 
platforms’ automatic policing of allegedly harmful speech according to geoloca-
tion.101 To properly conceptualize “platform ethics” and consider the ways in which 
intermediaries can balance self-regulation with legal compliance, an understanding 
of various models of intermediary liability laws is necessary. 
                                                          
 95. See Lynn Adelman & Jon Deitrich, Extremist Speech and the Internet: The Continuing Importance 
of Brandenberg, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 361, 370 (2010); see also L.A. Powe, Jr., Brandenburg: 
Then and Now, 44 TEXAS TECH L. REV. 69 (2011). 
 96. See generally CITRON, supra note 91. 
 97. Id. at 69; Franks, supra note 91, at 246. 
 98. See Eric E. Schmidt, Eric Schmidt on How to Build a Better Web, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/07/opinion/eric-schmidt-on-how-to-build-a-better-web.html (calling 
on online intermediaries such as Google—the company he cofounded—to create “spell-checkers . . . for 
hate and harassment.”). 
 99. See, e.g., Ronald Deibert & Rafal Rohozinski, Beyond Denial: Introducing Next-Generation In-
formation Access Controls, in ACCESS CONTROLLED: THE SHAPING OF POWER, RIGHTS, AND RULE 
IN CYBERSPACE 3 (Ronald Deibert et al. eds., 2010); LAURA DENARDIS, THE GLOBAL WAR FOR 
INTERNET GOVERNANCE 168 (2014). 
 100. JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET? ILLUSIONS OF A 
BORDERLESS WORLD 10 (2006). 
 101. See infra Part III.A. 
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III. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
Understanding the philosophies behind laws of intermediary liability can en-
rich the discussion of the potential ethical obligations that intermediaries have when 
it comes to dealing with harmful UGC. In particular, one must understand how lia-
bility models differ in terms of privileging self-regulation within the industry and 
protecting the consumers who use social media platforms. Indeed, the approaches 
of the following nine polities vary rather widely on this spectrum. Furthermore, 
none are completely static, with several having made major—and not necessarily 
clear—shifts in their approach to intermediary liability in recent years. 
The preceding discussion of conceptions of harmful speech, particularly in the 
context of networked communication, will prove useful in a comparative analysis 
of various legal regimes defining intermediary liability in relation to harmful third-
party speech. Physical, relational, and reactive harms are regarded with varying de-
grees of severity in the laws of various countries. Social media platforms complicate 
the already messy distinctions between these types of harms because, as discussed 
above, they can both amplify and blur the lines between these harms. Therefore, the 
following comparative analysis should be viewed through the lens of how laws of 
intermediary liability view the shifting sands of the harms of speech on social me-
dia.102 
A. United States Model 
The United States’ approach to intermediary liability is enshrined in § 230 of 
the 1996 Communications Decency Act (“CDA”).103 The law grants digital inter-
mediaries (which the law refers to as “interactive computer services”) immunity 
from civil liability for content published by third parties on its platforms even when 
they are notified of the presence of the content or when they choose to take control 
over the content and remove it in a “Good Samaritan” act.104 Knowledge of other 
types of tortious material does not force intermediaries to remove the material.105 In 
the preamble to § 230, Congress declared that digital intermediaries deserve “a min-
imum of government regulation” because they “offer users a great degree of control 
over the information that they receive, as well as the potential for even greater con-
trol in the future as technology develops.”106 It called the Internet a “forum for a 
true diversity of political discourse,” facilitated by digital intermediaries.107 Con-
gress declared that its intent in passing the law was “to preserve the vibrant and 
                                                          
 102. It should be known that these laws apply to intermediaries that are global in scope—such as Fa-
cebook, Twitter, and YouTube—as well as autochthonous platforms. A few examples of the latter type 
will be listed infra in each polity’s respective subsection, when applicable. 
 103. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2018). 
 104. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A) (“No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held 
liable on account of . . . any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access” to tortious third-
party content). 
 105. See Zeran v. AOL, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that § 230 gave AOL immunity 
from liability for defamatory third-party content despite the fact that it had been made aware of the 
existence of the content and had taken steps to remove it). 
 106. 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(2), (4). 
 107. Id. § 230(a)(3). 
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competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive 
computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation.”108 
Section 230 is based on two important rationales related to the connection be-
tween intermediaries, commerce, and freedom of expression. First, it seeks to pro-
tect intermediaries from having to incur the great costs necessary to sift through the 
terabytes of content they host and weed out defamatory material, because this could 
potentially chill their desire to host otherwise free expression online.109 Second, § 
230 seeks to prevent individuals (whether public figures or not) from having an 
incentive to serve Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”) with potentially successful 
requests for taking down content, thus protecting speech from frivolous 
takedowns.110 
United States case law involving § 230 reinforces Congress’s philosophy on 
the broad, speech-friendly benefits of the provision despite its obvious side effect 
of allowing potentially harmful speech to flourish. In Zeran v. AOL, the Fourth Cir-
cuit stated that § 230, quite simply, was a “policy choice . . . not to deter harmful 
speech through the separate route of imposing tort liability on companies that serve 
as intermediaries,” thereby “maintain[ing] the robust nature of Internet communi-
cation.”111 In DiMeo v. Max, the United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania averred that “we should expect such [harmful] speech to occur in 
a medium in which citizens from all walks of life have a voice.”112 
Courts have held that digital intermediaries lose their immunity from liability 
under § 230 if they “materially contribute” to the creation of unlawful content on 
their platforms. For example, in Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. 
Roommates.com, the Ninth Circuit held that a dropdown menu allowing users to 
select the race and gender of potential roommates sought through Roommates.com 
materially contributed to the violation of federal Fair Housing Act.113 However, the 
Sixth Circuit held that an employee of a website goading users into posting defam-
atory statements on the site did not amount to a material contribution to the creation 
of that content.114 Together, these cases highlight the power of § 230 in affording 
exceptional immunity from liability to platforms. 
B. European Model 
The goal of focusing on intermediary liability at the supranational level across 
the European Union (“EU”) is to allow for key principles and values surrounding 
intermediary liability across the continent to be more easily identified.115 Interme-
diary liability laws of each EU member state will not be the focus of this section. 
                                                          
 108. Id. § 230(b)(2). 
 109. See David S. Ardia, Free Speech Savior or Shield for Scoundrels: An Empirical Study of Interme-
diary Immunity Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 373 
(2010). 
 110. See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333 (arguing that “notice-based liability for interactive computer service 
providers would provide third parties with a no-cost means to create the basis for future lawsuits.”). 
 111. Id. at 330–31. 
 112. 433 F. Supp. 2d 523, 533 (E.D. Pa. 2006). 
 113. 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 114. Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 2014). 
 115. According to estimates from StatCounter, U.S. based social media companies (Facebook, Twitter, 
etc.) account for more than 99% of all social media use in the EU. See Social Media Stats Europe Sept 
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However, attention will be paid to a 2017 German law imposing hefty fines against 
social media platforms for unlawful third-party content. 
The regime of intermediary liability in the EU is based on Directive 
2000/31/EC—the so-called “e-Commerce Directive.”116 Recital 46 of the e-Com-
merce Directive states digital intermediaries—here referred to as providers of an 
“information society service”—benefit from a limitation of liability if “upon ob-
taining actual knowledge or awareness of illegal activities[, they] act expeditiously 
to remove or to disable access to the information concerned.”117 Recital 48 says EU 
Member States may “apply duties of care” on digital intermediaries, “which can 
reasonably be expected from them and which are specified by national law, in order 
to detect and prevent certain types of illegal activities.”118 
Various European courts have broadly interpreted “illegal activities” under this 
Directive to include content that causes relational or emotional harms,119 such as 
defamation, violation of privacy, and hate speech.120 A duty of care is established 
when the alleged victim of such harms appropriately notifies the digital intermedi-
aries of the content in question on their platforms, thereby putting these companies 
on the legal hook for removing it.121 However, this duty of care is only established 
in a notice-and-takedown regime.122 Article 15(1) of the e-Commerce Directive pro-
hibits Member States from “impos[ing] a general obligation on providers . . . to 
monitor the information which they transmit or store, nor a general obligation ac-
tively to seek facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity.”123 Therefore, Euro-
pean officials can only call on digital intermediaries to follow a moral duty to police 
harmful speech published on their platforms, as they did following the 2015 Charlie 
Hebdo attacks.124 Meanwhile, the EU’s 2017 Terrorism Directive decrees that “an 
effective means of combating terrorism on the Internet is to remove online content 
                                                          
2017 - Sept 2018, STATCOUNTER, http://gs.statcounter.com/social-media-stats/all/Europe (last visited 
Aug. 26, 2018). 
 116. Directive 2000/31, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal 
aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market, 2000 
O.J. (L 178) 1, 14 (EC). 
 117. Id. at (46). 
 118. Id. at (48). 
 119. SMOLLA, supra note 18, at 48–49. 
 120. See Timothy Pinto, Niri Shan, Stefan Freytag, Elisabeth von Braunscheig & Velérie Aumage, 
Liability of Online Publishers for User Generated Content: A European Perspective, 27 COMM. LAW. 
5 (2010). 
 121. Marcelo Thompson, Beyond Gatekeeping: The Normative Responsibility of Internet Intermediar-
ies, 18 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 783, 806 (2016). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Directive 2000/31, art. 15, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on Cer-
tain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce, in the Internal 
Market, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1 (EC). 
 124. Joint Statement of the Ministers of Interior, European Union (Jan. 11, 2015), https://eu2015.lv/im-
ages/news/2015_01_11_Joint_statement_of_ministers_for_interrior.pdf. The statement read, in part: 
We are concerned at the increasingly frequent use of the Internet to fuel hatred and violence and 
signal our determination to ensure that the Internet is not abused to this end, while safeguarding 
that it remains, in scrupulous observance of fundamental freedoms, a forum for free expression, in 
full respect of the law. With this in mind, the partnership of the major Internet providers is essential 
to create the conditions of a swift reporting of material that aims to incite hatred and terror and the 
condition of its removing, where appropriate/possible. 
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constituting a public provocation to commit a terrorist offence [sic] at its source.”125 
The Terrorism Directive stipulates the following: 
Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure the prompt re-
moval of online content constituting a public provocation to commit a ter-
rorist offence [sic] . . . that is hosted in their territory. They shall also en-
deavour [sic] to obtain the removal of such content hosted outside their 
territory.126 
In keeping with the eCommerce Directive, the Terrorism Directive does not 
require intermediaries to regularly monitor their platforms for terrorist content.127 
The goal of the EU model of intermediary liability, as defined by the laws 
above, is to incentivize self-regulation by digital intermediaries by encouraging a 
proactive approach whereby companies would actively screen user-generated con-
tent and remove the manifestly unlawful material before upset users have a chance 
to notify them and thus place them within the prospects of liability.128 Thus, “Only 
when contents [are] manifestly unlawful—so that intermediaries would not have to 
appreciate their lawfulness—would the latter be required to react and eventually 
take them down or restrict access to them.”129 As with § 230, the philosophy behind 
the European approach to intermediary liability is that “private regulation is less 
dangerous than public regulation when it comes to the defence [sic] of freedom of 
expression.”130 
However, a 2015 ruling by the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) 
appeared to go against the eCommerce Directive’s policy of prohibiting general 
monitoring by intermediaries, throwing the state of intermediary liability law in the 
EU into disarray.131 In Delfi AS v. Estonia, a divided Grand Chamber of the ECtHR 
held that Delfi, an intermediary that maintained a comment section for news articles 
posted on its site, could be held liable for comments that were defamatory, 
amounted to hate speech, or incited violence because the intermediary was made 
aware and it commercially benefited from the comments.132 The court argued that 
an intermediary’s “economic interest in the publication of comments” is no differ-
ent from a publisher of print material.133 
                                                          
 125. Directive 2017/541, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2017 on Com-
batting Terrorism and Replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and amending Council 
Decision 2005/671/JHA, 2017 O.J. (L 88) 22 (EU). 
 126. Id. art. 21 § 1. 
 127. Id. at (23). 
 128. Sophie Stalla-Bourdillon, Sometimes One is Not Enough! Securing Freedom of Expression, En-
couraging Private Regulation, or Subsidizing Internet Intermediaries or All Three at the Same Time: 
The Dilemma of Internet Intermediaries’ Liability, 7 J. INT’L COM. L. & TECH. 154, 164–65 (2012). 
 129. Id. at 162. 
 130. Id. at 164. 
 131. See Lisl Brunner, The Liability of an Online Intermediary for Third Party Content: The Watchdog 
Becomes the Monitor: Intermediary Liability after Delfi v. Estonia, 16 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 163, 164 
(2016); Bart van der Sloot, The Practical and Theoretical Problems with ‘Balancing’ Delfi, Coty and 
the Redundancy of the Human Rights Framework, 23 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 439, 448 (2016). 
 132. Delfi AS v. Estonia, App. No. 64569/09, 2015 Eur. Ct. H.R. 60–61, https://hu-
doc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-155105%22]}. 
 133. Id. at 44. 
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Furthermore, the court held that the societal interests in stanching the flow of 
hate speech online was justification for holding intermediaries like Delfi liable for 
comments posted to their platforms. In particular, the court wrote the following: 
[I]n cases such as the present one, where third-party user comments are in 
the form of hate speech and direct threats to the physical integrity of indi-
viduals . . . the rights and interests of others and of society as a whole may 
entitle Contracting States to impose liability on Internet news portals, with-
out contravening Article 10 of the [European] Convention [on Human 
Rights protecting the right to freedom of expression], if they fail to take 
measures to remove clearly unlawful comments without delay, even with-
out notice from the alleged victim or from third parties.134 
However, the court was not unanimous in this conclusion that intermediaries 
like Delfi should have such a heavy burden on policing hate speech. Two judges 
dissented in the Delfi case and argued that because the majority’s opinion requires 
intermediaries to decide between monitoring user comments for racist or defama-
tory speech or not allowing comments at all, intermediaries will choose the latter, 
thus giving them “an invitation to self-censorship at its worst.”135 Although the dis-
senting judges acknowledged the comments were racist and defamatory and the po-
tential to incite violence were reason enough to prosecute the individuals who 
posted them, they argued that Delfi should not be held liable merely for opening up 
a discussion forum about issues of public concern and having that forum comman-
deered by others to express unlawful opinions.136 
Meanwhile, in June 2017, Germany passed the Act to Improve the Enforcement 
of Rights on Social Networks, also known as the “Network Enforcement Act.”137 
The law, which was enacted in October 2017, requires social media networks with 
more than two million users to remove UGC that is “clearly illegal” within 24 hours 
of receiving a notice from a user about the content.138 If the content is not clearly 
illegal, the social network is given seven days to investigate and decide whether or 
not it is worthy of deletion.139 The law’s list of illegal content includes propaganda 
of unconstitutional organizations, encouragement of violent crimes, and incitement 
to hatred.140 The law mandates any social networks that receive more than 100 no-
tifications of infringing content in a year must publish biannual reports regarding 
how they handle those notifications.141 A social network that intentionally or negli-
                                                          
 134. Id. at 59–60. 
 135. Id. at 68 (Sajó, J., & Tsotsoria, J., dissenting). 
 136. Id. at 72–73, 77. 
 137. See generally Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz [NetzDG] [Network Enforcement Act], June 30, 
2017, Federal Law Gazette at 3352, (Ger.), https://www.gesetze-im-inter-
net.de/netzdg/BJNR335210017.html. For a concise summary of the law in English, see Jenny Gesley, 
Germany: Social Media Platforms to Be Held Accountable for Hosted Content Under “Facebook Act”, 
LIBR. OF CONGRESS (July 11, 2017), https://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/germany-social-me-
dia-platforms-to-be-held-accountable-for-hosted-content-under-facebook-act/. 
 138. Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz [NetzDG] [Network Enforcement Act], June 30, 2017, Federal 
Law Gazette at 3353, art. 1 § 3 ¶ 2 no. 2 (Ger.), https://www.gesetze-im-inter-
net.de/netzdg/BJNR335210017.html. 
 139. Id. art. 1 § 3 ¶ 2 no. 3. 
 140. Id. art. 1 § 1 ¶ 3. 
 141. Id. art. 1 § 3 ¶ 1. 
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gently fails to follow the mandates of the law faces a fine of up to 50 million eu-
ros.142 Coupled with the Delfi decision, Germany’s Network Enforcement Act indi-
cates a growing trend in EU law toward strict regulation of digital intermediaries. 
C. United Kingdom Model 
As the United Kingdom (“UK”) continues its slow yet inevitable exit from the 
EU, it is important to study how UK law treats intermediary liability separately from 
the EU.143 The UK is also worth studying due to how active the British government 
has been in addressing issues related to intermediary liability and mitigating harm 
since 2013, and particularly since the phenomenon of fake news became an issue in 
2016.144 In January 2018, the UK Department for Digital, Culture, Media, and Sport 
published a two-page Digital Charter (the “Charter”) putting forth policy goals for 
regulating online intermediaries by establishing “norms and rules for the online 
world.”145 
The Charter lists three priorities: (1) “protecting people from harmful content 
and behaviour [sic], including building understanding and resilience, and working 
with industry to encourage the development of technological solutions”; (2) “look-
ing at the legal liability that online platforms have for the content shared on their 
sites, including considering how we could get more effective action through better 
use of the existing legal frameworks and definitions”; and (3) “limiting the spread 
and impact of disinformation intended to mislead for political, personal and/or fi-
nancial gain.”146 The Charter called on a multi-stakeholder approach for addressing 
these priorities that involved self-regulation within the tech industry alongside gov-
ernment regulation.147 
Britain is also home to the UK Internet Service Providers’ Association (“ISPA 
UK”), a trade organization comprising Britain’s Internet service providers.148 Its 
Code of Practice explicitly excludes issues related to third-party content.149 For ex-
ample, the UK Code encourages members to “use their reasonable endeavours [sic] 
                                                          
 142. Id. art. 1 § 4 ¶ 5. 
 143. According to estimates from StatCounter, U.S. based social media companies (Facebook, Twitter, 
etc.) account for more than 99% of all social media use in the UK. See Social Media Stats United King-
dom - September 2018, STATCOUNTER, http://gs.statcounter.com/social-media-stats/all/united-kingdom 
(last visited Oct. 7, 2018); see also Market Share Held by the Leading Social Networks in the United 
Kingdom (UK) as of July 2018, STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/280295/market-share-
held-by-the-leading-social-networks-in-the-united-kingdom-uk/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2018). 
 144. See generally Intermediary Liability, MEDIA POL’Y PROJECT BLOG, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/me-
diapolicyproject/tag/intermediary-liability/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2018); see also Closing Date: UK ‘Fake 
News’ Inquiry, MEDIA POL’Y PROJECT BLOG (Mar. 3, 2017), http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mediapolicypro-
ject/event/uk-fake-news-inquiry-closes/ (discussing an inquiry launched by the UK Parliament’s Cul-
ture, Media and Sport Committee into defining fake news and discussing potential policy solutions for 
abating it); Brett G. Johnson, British PM Calls for Nationwide Default Filters to Combat Internet Por-
nography, 18 SILHA CTR. STUDY MEDIA ETHICS & L. 30 (2013) [hereinafter British PM]. 
 145. UK DEPARTMENT FOR DIGITAL, CULTURE, MEDIA & SPORT, POLICY PAPER: DIGITAL CHARTER 
(2018) (UK), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/digital-charter/digital-charter. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. See generally ISPA UK, https://www.ispa.org.uk (last visited Oct. 7, 2018). 
 149. ISPA Code of Practice, INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS’ ASS’N (Apr. 19, 2002) (UK),  
napod.org.uk/ispa_code_of_practice.doc. 
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to ensure th[at] . . . Services (excluding Third Party Content) and Promotional Ma-
terial do not contain . . . material inciting violence, cruelty or racial hatred,”150 and 
“are not used to promote or facilitate practices which are contrary to UK law.”151 
Meanwhile, the only concrete legislation governing intermediary liability in the UK 
deals with issues of libel as defined by the 2013 Defamation Act—part of a broad 
attempt to reform the UK’s libel laws.152 Section 5 of the Defamation Act stipulates 
that a digital intermediary is not liable if it can prove that it was not responsible for 
the posting of defamatory statements on its platform.153 However, if the defamed 
party notifies the intermediary of the defamatory statements and asks it to remove 
them, the intermediary could be held liable for the statements if it fails to remove 
them.154 Thus, the UK approach to intermediary liability is similar to the United 
States’ approach in that it seeks to privilege self-regulation within the industry ra-
ther than state regulation. 
D. South African Model 
In South Africa,155 the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act of 
2002 establishes a notice-and-takedown regime similar to other models discussed 
above.156 Intermediaries are required to remove infringing content upon receiving 
actual knowledge of it,157 but they have no general obligation to monitor content on 
their platforms.158 The law also permits the Director General of the South African 
Department of Communications to appoint a “cyber inspector” who has the power 
to monitor websites for illegal activity and issue takedown notices.159 
The Internet Service Providers Association (“ISPA”) of South Africa, a trade 
organization representing all Internet service providers and intermediaries estab-
lished in South Africa (though not necessarily all those operating in the country), 
maintains a Code of Conduct that sets voluntary self-regulatory principles that en-
sure intermediaries not only comply with the law, but that they do so transpar-
ently.160 The Code of Conduct, which was last updated in 2016, states that “[t]here 
is no general obligation on any ISPA member to monitor services provided to cus-
tomers, but a member is obliged to take appropriate action where it becomes aware 
of any unlawful content or conduct.”161 The Code of Conduct obliges members to 
                                                          
 150. Id. § 2.2.1 (emphasis added). 
 151. Id. § 2.2.2. 
 152. Defamation Act 2013, c. 26, §§ 5, 10 (Eng.). 
 153. Id. § 5(2). 
 154. Id. § 5(3)(b)-(c). 
 155. U.S. based social networks dominate in South Africa. See Penetration of Leading Social Networks 
in South Africa as of 3rd Quarter 2017, STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/284468/south-af-
rica-social-network-penetration/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2018). However, the network 2go, which was 
founded in Johannesburg and is currently based out of Cape Town, is a popular autochthonous social 
network. See 2GO, http://www.2go.im/. 
 156. Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002 § 75, (S. Afr.), http://www.inter-
net.org.za/ect_act.html. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. § 78(1). 
 159. Id. §§ 80, 81. 
 160. See Code of Conduct, INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS’ ASS’N (June 1, 2016) (S. 
Afr.), https://ispa.org.za/code-of-conduct/. 
 161. Id. § J(26). 
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establish clear guidelines for how users can initiate notice-and-takedown proce-
dures, keep records of all requests for removing content, and provide regular reports 
on such requests to the ISPA.162 
By working in concert with South African law governing intermediaries, the 
Code of Conduct is designed to hold intermediaries accountable for their actions by 
ensuring that they do not remove too much or too little content. In doing so, the 
Code of Conduct offers a means for intermediaries to balance the competing goals 
of promoting free expression and preventing the proliferation of harmful UGC. By 
governing ISPs’ practices toward handling third-party content, the South African 
ISPA is distinct from the ISPA UK, which, as noted above, explicitly excludes is-
sues related to third-party content from its Code of Conduct.163 However, it is sim-
ilar to the UK approach to intermediary liability in that it seeks to incentivize self-
regulation over state regulation. 
E. Australian Model 
Outside of the realm of copyright law, Australia has no specific legislation 
dealing with intermediary liability in the harmful third-party context.164 Thus, 
judge-made law has defined the contours of intermediary liability in Australia, and 
courts have been inconsistent on recent issues. One example of conflicting common 
law is on the issue of whether Google is considered a publisher of, and therefore 
considered liable for, defamatory search results. In Trkulja v. Google, the Supreme 
Court of Victoria held that Google is considered a publisher in the context of search 
results.165 In particular, the court held that because employees of Google possess 
“skill and expertise . . . employed by Google for the purpose of creating a search 
engine,” and because “Google intends its search engines to publish material on the 
[I]nternet in response to user queries,” Google must be considered a publisher.166 
The court called Google’s argument an attempt to “confer immunity out of thin 
air,”167 and held “[i]f Google is to have immunity from suit, it must be bestowed 
upon it by the legislature.”168 
However, the Supreme Court of New South Wales held in a separate case that 
Google is not considered a publisher of defamatory search results because the 
search results are generated via algorithm, not human activity.169 Like the Victoria 
Supreme Court in Trkulja, the New South Wales court acknowledged algorithms 
were created by humans, but the latter disagreed that this connection rose to the 
level of human activity required for Google to be considered a publisher.170 The 
New South Wales court noted that because the individual notified Google of the 
                                                          
 162. Id. §§ J(29)-(31). 
 163. ISPA Code of Practice, INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS’ ASS’N (Apr. 19, 2002) 
(UK), napod.org.uk/ispa_code_of_practice.doc. 
 164. U.S. based social media firms dominate the Australian market, accounting for more than 99% of 
the country’s social media use. See generally David Cowling, Social Media Statistics Australia – April 
2018, SOCIALMEDIANEWS (May 1, 2018), https://www.socialmedianews.com.au/social-media-statis-
tics-australia-april-2018/. 
 165. Trkulja v Google Inc. [2015] VSC 635 (17 November 2015) 67 (Austl.). 
 166. Id. at 54. 
 167. Id. at 77. 
 168. Id. at 75. 
 169. Bleyer v Google Inc., [2014] NSWSC 897, 83-85 (12 August 2014) (Austl.). 
 170. Id. at 83. 
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posts and asked to have them removed, that might turn Google into a publisher 
under Australian law, thereby making it liable for the posts.171 However, the court 
held that because the plaintiff claimed only three people in Australia saw the de-
famatory search results, the cost of holding Google responsible for the search results 
outweighed any benefits from mitigating any harms in doing so—in other words, 
the case was dismissed for lack of proportionality.172 
It is illustrative to contrast both of these cases with a case involving defamatory 
statements made on a website with a much smaller operation than Google’s. In Pis-
cioneri v. Brisciani, the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory held that 
an individual who ran a website that contained defamatory posts from users, and 
who encouraged users to make those posts, must be considered a publisher and thus 
liable for the posts of the users on his site.173 Thus, according to Australian case 
law, the line distinguishing the terms of liability for global intermediaries such as 
Google and local small-time intermediaries appears to be faded, gray, and porous. 
F. Brazilian Model 
In Brazil,174 intermediary liability is codified in a 2014 law known as the 
“Marco Civil da Internet” (the “Marco Civil”).175 Roughly translated as an “Internet 
Bill of Rights,” the statute establishes, among other things, that Brazilian citizens 
have a right to net neutrality.176 The Marco Civil lists a special provision under 
Article 21 for the phenomenon of “revenge porn,” whereby intermediaries will be 
held criminally liable if they either purposefully host or fail to remove revenge porn 
photos on their platforms.177 Articles 18 and 19 of the Marco Civil provide that 
digital intermediaries are immune from civil liability for third-party content unless 
they fail to remove defamatory or racist content after receiving a valid court order 
asking them to do so.178 The connection between defamation and racism in this law 
should not be overlooked. 
Section 3 of Article 140 in Brazil’s Penal Code states the following: “If [a] 
defamatory act involves the use of references to race, color, ethnicity, religion, 
origin, elderly status[,] or disability” the penalty will be “imprisonment of one to 
three years and a fine.”179 A 1997 anti-racism law reiterates Brazil’s intention to 
                                                          
 171. Id. at 85–87. 
 172. Id. at 62. 
 173. Brisciani v Piscioneri [No. 4] (2016) ACTCA 32, 17 (Austl.), 2016 WL 4239922. The facts in 
this case are analogous to those in Jones v. Dirty World Entertainment Recording, LLC. See Jones v. 
Dirty World Entm’t Recordings, LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 415–16 (6th Cir. 2014). 
 174. U.S. based WhatsApp and Facebook dominate the Brazilian social media market. See Brazil: Most 
Popular Social Network Apps as of June 2017, STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statis-
tics/746969/most-popular-social-networkapps-brazil/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2018). 
 175. Lei No. 12.965, de 23 de Abril de 2014, CÓDIGO CIVIL [C.C.] (Braz.). See Alexandre Pontieri, 
Título: Marco Civil da Internet - Neutralidade de Rede e Liberdade de Expressão, JUS.COM.BR (July 
2018), https://jus.com.br/artigos/67822/titulo-marco-civil-da-internet-neutralidade-de-rede-e-liberdade-
de-expressao. 
 176. Lei No. 12.965 art. 3 § IV. 
 177. Id. art. 21. 
 178. Id. art. 18, 19. 
 179. Lei No. 2.848, de 7 de Dezembro de 1940, CÓDIGO PENAL [C.P.] (Braz.). 
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enforce racism as a defamatory crime, or a “crime against honor.”180 Indeed, Bra-
zilian law views racism as anathema to the identity of the Brazilian nation, and thus 
punishes racism under the philosophy that it is akin to seditious libel.181 
One particular example of action taken against a digital intermediary (albeit 
prior to the passing of the Marco Civil) is illustrative of the Brazilian context of 
intermediary liability. In September 2012, two videos appeared on YouTube alleg-
ing Alcides Bernal—mayoral candidate for the city of Campo Grande in the Brazil-
ian state of Mato Grosso do Sul—hated poor people, unlawfully enriched himself, 
paid an ex-lover to abort a child he fathered, denied being the child’s father after he 
was born, and then beat the child after finally admitting he was the father.182 Bernal 
filed a lawsuit against Google Brazil, the owner and operator of YouTube in Brazil, 
for publishing defamatory electoral propaganda against him in the run-up to an elec-
tion, which is a violation of Article 243 of the Brazilian Electoral Code.183 
Wanting to uphold the rules for conducting free and fair elections as painstak-
ingly defined in the Electoral Code, Judge Flávio Saad Perón of the 35th Electoral 
Zone of the municipality of Campo Grande—a division of the Regional Electoral 
Court, known as the Tribunal Regional Eleitoral of the state of Mato Grosso do 
Sul—ordered the video be taken down.184 However, the head of Google Brazil, Fa-
bio José Silva Coelho, refused to obey the order, citing a commitment to upholding 
the values of free speech.185 Judge Saad then ordered Coelho placed under house 
arrest for disobeying a judge’s order—a violation of Article 347 of the Electoral 
Code—and ordered a 24-hour suspension of all Google and YouTube services in 
the state.186 The judge’s order attracted national and international media attention 
on the otherwise ordinary and relatively insignificant election.187 Google Brazil re-
leased a statement saying it was “appealing the decision that ordered the removal 
of the YouTube video because, in being a platform, Google is not responsible for 
                                                          
 180. Hernández, supra note 68, at 828. See Lei No. 9.459, de 13 de Maio de 1997, CÓDIGO CIVIL [C.C.] 
(Braz.). 
 181. See Prejudice Against Being Prejudiced, supra note 85, at 57. 
 182. Bryan Bishop, Google Complies with Brazilian Court Order to Pull Political Video from YouTube, 
VERGE (Sept. 27, 2012, 9:06 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2012/9/27/3420574/google-youtube-bra-
zil-court-order-pulls-political-video; see also Brad Hayes, Google Exec Questioned Over Brazil Election 





 183. Felipe Correa, Brazil Confronts Google – and it’s Personal, FREE SPEECH DEBATE (Nov. 1, 2012), 
http://freespeechdebate.com/case/brazil-confronts-google-and-its-personal/. See Lei No. 4.737, de 15 de 
Julho de 1965, CÓDIGO CIVIL [C.C.] art. 243, de 09.04.1964 (Braz.). 
 184. Bishop, supra note 182. 
 185. Reuters, Top Google Executive in Brazil Faces Arrest over Video, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2012), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/26/business/global/top-google-executive-in-brazil-faces-arrest-
over-video.html. 
 186. Adi Robertson, Brazilian Judge Orders Arrest of Local Google President Over Negative Election 
Videos on YouTube, VERGE (Sept. 25, 2012, 2:09 PM), https://www.thev-
erge.com/2012/9/25/3406238/brazil-google-president-arrest. See Lei No. 4.737, de 15 de Julho de 1965, 
CÓDIGO CIVIL [C.C.] art. 347, de 09.04.1964 (Braz.). 
 187. Brazilian Police Detain Local Google President, BBC (Sept. 27, 2012), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-19737364. 
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the content posted on its site.”188 The company did not comment on Coelho’s arrest. 
However, on September 26, 2012, Google removed the videos from YouTube.189 
The philosophical foundation of the Brazilian approach to intermediary liabil-
ity is based on the Brazilian Consumer Protection Code (“CPC”) of 1990,190 which 
lays out numerous rights of consumer protection. The philosophical thrust of the 
CPC is that consumers deserve protection from businesses because, ultimately, con-
sumers are the reason businesses are in business to begin with; in other words, con-
sumers deserve a substantial amount of legal power over the businesses that profit 
off of them.191 In the context of intermediary liability, the theory is that because 
online communication platforms profit off of users by commodifying both their 
content and their data, these platforms should ultimately respond to users when this 
venture turns harmful.192 This philosophy parallels the reasoning in the ECtHR’s 
Delfi decision that the commercial incentive of intermediaries to profit off of harm-
ful speech demands a legal remedy to de-incentivize the facilitation of such 
speech.193 Therefore, the Brazilian approach to intermediary liability can be viewed 
as heavily favoring consumer protection over affording immunity to platforms, even 
in spite of the fact that significant political speech may be chilled to achieve that 
end. 
G. Indian Model 
In India,194 Article 79 of the country’s Information Technology (“IT”) Act of 
2008 stipulates that a digital intermediary is not held liable for third-party content 
except when it either materially contributes to the creation of the content, or if it 
receives actual knowledge that the content is unlawful.195 In 2011, the Indian gov-
ernment published the “Information Technology (Intermediary guidelines) Rules” 
in its official gazette to further define what might make third-party content unlaw-
ful.196 This includes content that “is grossly harmful, harassing, blasphemous, de-
famatory, obscene, pornographic, paedophilic [sic], libelous, invasive of another’s 
privacy, hateful, or racially [or] ethnically objectionable, disparaging, relating or 
encouraging money laundering or gambling, or otherwise unlawful in any manner 
whatever.”197                                                           
 188. Megan Geuss, Google’s Brazil Chief Detained by Federal Police Over YouTube Video, ARS 
TECHNICA (Sept. 26, 2012, 9:20 PM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/09/googles-brazil-chief-
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 189. Bishop, supra note 182. 
 190. Complying with Brazil’s Consumer Protection Code, DIAZREUS (Jan. 27, 2012), http://diaz-
reus.com/complying-with-brazils-consumer-protection-code/. See Lei No. 8.078, de 11 de Setembro de 
1990, CÓDIGO CIVIL [C.C.] (Braz.). 
 191. Nicolo Zingales, The Brazilian Approach to Internet Intermediary Liability: Blueprint for a 
Global Regime?, 4 INTERNET POL’Y REV. 1 (2015). 
 192. Id. 
 193. Delfi AS v. Estonia, App. No. 64569/09, 2015 Eur. Ct. H.R. 69, https://hu-
doc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-155105%22]}. 
 194. Although Facebook, Twitter and Instagram are dominate the Indian social media market, the au-
tochthonous social network Hike is very popular among Indian Internet users. See Anish Gawande, This 
App is Changing the Way Millions of Indians Use the Internet, CNN (Aug. 3, 2017, 11:28 AM), 
 195. The Information Technology (Amendment) Act, 2008, No. 10 § 79, Acts of Parliament, 2009 
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13-14 (Apr. 11, 2011). 
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According to the 2011 guidelines, intermediaries must follow “due diligence” 
to remove unlawful material.198 The doctrine of due diligence comes from the realm 
of Indian business law and has many meanings, none of which have been clearly 
defined by a court or codified by a statute.199 However, for the purposes of under-
standing the Indian philosophy behind intermediary liability, the doctrine of due 
diligence essentially means that once a company becomes aware that it is profiting 
off of the unlawful practices of a business partner, it must cease those unlawful 
business activities.200 To illustrate this principle, in 2008, the Delhi High Court in 
dicta condemned a website that placed the maximization of profits over “[s]afe-
guard[ing] . . . prevailing moral values” in regard to its business model of profiting 
off of spreading links to obscene material.201 Similarly, in July 2018, the Indian 
government warned the message-sharing platform WhatsApp that it could not es-
cape accountability and responsibility for false rumors spread by users that led to 
the lynching deaths of 18 people.202 Thus, the philosophy behind the Indian model 
of intermediary liability is similar to that of both the Brazilian model and the Delfi 
decision, whereby dutifully treating consumers is encouraged.203 
H. Japanese Model 
In Japan,204 Act No. 137 of 2001 (the Act on the Limitation of Liability for 
Damages of Specified Telecommunications Service Providers and the Right to De-
mand Disclosure of Identification Information of the Senders, hereinafter referred 
to as the “Act”) governs intermediary liability in Japan.205 Article 3 of the Act ex-
plains that digital intermediaries “shall not be liable for any loss incurred” from an 
infringement of a user’s rights (namely, to reputation and privacy), “unless where 
it is technically possible to take measures for preventing such information from be-
ing transmitted to unspecified persons.”206 
The Act is similar to § 230 in that it assures intermediaries that act to stop an 
infringement, whether proactively or upon receiving notice, do not open themselves 
up to liability.207 However, like some other legal regimes discussed here, the Act 
                                                          
 198. Id. § 3. 
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stipulates that intermediaries lose immunity from liability if they have knowledge 
of an infringement and do not take action.208 Act No. 137 also goes a step further in 
empowering users by granting alleged victims of infringement the right to demand 
that intermediaries hand over information about the alleged infringing parties, in-
cluding their names and addresses, provided that they have sufficient evidence to 
show the specific party infringed upon their rights.209 In the spirit of due process, 
the intermediaries are further required to notify the alleged infringers that their in-
formation is being sought.210 Thus, the Japanese approach to intermediary liability 
appears to balance competing interests of platforms and users in a spirit of social 
responsibility. 
I. South Korean Model 
In South Korea,211 intermediary liability is rooted in Article 44 of the Act on 
the Promotion of Information and Communications Network Utilization and Infor-
mation Protection, which gives a rather detailed account of what such liability must 
look like.212 First, Article 44 broadly stipulates that “[n]o user may circulate any 
information violating another person’s rights, including invasion of privacy and 
defamation, through an information and communications network,” and “[e]very 
provider of information and communications services shall make efforts to prevent 
any [such] information . . . from being circulated through the information and com-
munications network operated and managed by it.”213 Doing so will lead to the in-
termediary’s liability being “mitigated or discharged.”214 
Second, Article 44 states that the victim of an “invasion of privacy or defama-
tion” has the right to demand a deletion of the infringing content, as well as a right 
to a rebuttal, provided he or she can furnish evidence of the violation.215 When such 
a situation arises, the intermediary must post a public notice on its platform that the 
situation occurred and that it is attempting to rectify it.216 If the intermediary is un-
sure of whether the content was infringing, it can temporarily deny access to the 
content for up to 30 days.217 
Third, Article 44 states that if an intermediary voluntarily removes content that 
is defamatory or invades a user’s privacy, it will not have assumed liability for the 
content; this puts the Korean intermediary liability regime on par with several others 
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discussed here in terms of offering a “Good Samaritan” clause for platforms.218 Fi-
nally, Article 44 stipulates that upon an order from the government, intermediaries 
must remove several types of unlawful content, including obscene material, defam-
atory messages, content that “arouses fear or apprehension,” content that “divulges 
a state secret,” and content that that “aides or abets in the committing of a criminal 
act.”219 
Until 2010, intermediaries were subject to liability if they failed to maintain 
procedures for unmasking users who fraudulently use another user’s identity.220 If 
intermediaries with “more than 100,000 users” did not routinely furnish this infor-
mation when requested, they were mandated by a 2005 law to require users to post 
comments under their real names.221 However, in 2012, the Korean Constitutional 
Court held that this provision of Article 44 was unconstitutional because it chilled 
individuals’ anonymous speech without sufficiently fulfilling the provision’s goal 
of minimizing harms resulting from anonymous speech.222 Despite this ruling, the 
Korean model, like the Japanese model, mandates that intermediaries must “furnish 
the name and address” of a user who “defames or violates the privacy” rights of 
another user if the latter can prove he or she can prevail in a civil or criminal defa-
mation proceeding.223 The victim receiving the “information may not use the infor-
mation for any purpose other than filing a civil or criminal complaint.”224 
In 2012, the Korean Constitutional Court upheld the constitutionality of Article 
44, holding that the notice-and-takedown regime it established did not unreasonably 
infringe upon freedom of expression.225 The court held Article 21 of the Korean 
Constitution,226 which mandates that freedom of expression enjoyed by media com-
panies must not infringe upon the individual rights of citizens (e.g., to honor and 
privacy) applied to digital intermediaries, and that the provisions of Article 44 im-
posed only minimal restrictions on freedom of expression.227 The court also noted 
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that Article 44 was good policy because it allowed digital intermediaries the oppor-
tunity to avoid costlier damages should they be found liable of facilitating UGC that 
either defamed or invaded the privacy of other users.228 The court also stressed the 
purpose of Article 44 was to protect individual users who found themselves victims 
of infringing content, and that it could not be invoked to squelch speech critical of 
the government.229 
In 2014,230 and again in 2015, the Korean Constitutional Court also upheld the 
constitutionality of the provision of Article 44 requiring intermediaries to remove 
content that divulges state secrets when notified by the Korea Communications 
Commission.231 All told, the South Korean approach to intermediary liability—
much like the Japanese model—appears to balance the competing interests of con-
sumer protection and due process for freedom of expression, and it affords plat-
forms a reasonable degree of immunity from liability. 
J. Concluding Thoughts on the Comparative Analysis 
The nine models above are not a complete representation of how democratic 
polities conceive of the laws of intermediary liability in the context of extreme 
speech. However, they do reveal points along a spectrum. At one end, intermediar-
ies are afforded exceptional immunity from liability; at the other, these platforms 
are subject to a strict notice-and-takedown regime when it comes to extreme UGC. 
Understanding this spectrum is key to distilling a set of principles for ethical oper-
ations by social media platforms. 
The United States model of § 230 sits on the former end of the spectrum. Plat-
forms in the United States only face liability for harmful UGC when they materially 
contribute to its creation.232 This model affords platforms a high degree of control 
over users’ content with little responsibility for it,233 and some have argued this is 
the main impetus for the success of United States social networks and other plat-
forms that traffic in UGC.234 Moving along the spectrum, the UK and South African 
models share the goals of the United States model of promoting self-regulation 
among platforms, though the latter two models more actively encourage self-regu-
lation through government-supported, non-binding codes of conduct. 
On the opposite end of the spectrum are the Brazilian and Indian models, which 
see social networks as directly responsible for facilitating harmful UGC rather than 
mere neutral platforms. The Japanese and South Korean models fall somewhere in 
the middle of the spectrum, seeking to balance the goals of ensuring the commercial 
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success of platforms, promoting robust participation by users, and protecting users 
from undue harm caused by UGC. Meanwhile, the EU model appears to be shifting 
more toward the Brazilian and Indian models by placing more liability on platforms 
out of a spirit of consumer protection. The German “Network Enforcement Act,” as 
well as the 2015 Delfi decision, show the EU moving in this direction. Meanwhile, 
the messiness of the Australian model reveals how much in flux the issue of inter-
mediary liability for harmful UGC is. Indeed, even the United States model is not 
immune from this trend toward skepticism of social media platforms.235 Whether 
this trend results in the revision of § 230 remains to be seen. In the meantime, it 
would be wise for platforms to follow several ethical principles that can be distilled 
from the intermediary laws reviewed above. This article now turns to address those 
principles. 
IV. SYNTHESIS: PLATFORM ETHICS INFORMED BY LAW 
As I noted earlier, I have called elsewhere for scholars and industry leaders to 
conceptualize possible versions of “platform ethics,” or the notion that digital inter-
mediaries maintain some kind of duty to their users.236 In particular, I argue that 
three factors should be taken into account when defining platforms ethics: (1) the 
extent to which intermediaries maximize the speaking power of individual users; 
(2) the extent to which intermediaries mitigate against unnecessary harm against 
users; and (3) the extent to which intermediaries facilitate the goals of democracy. 
Ultimately, the goal is for platforms and users to decide what is the proper balance. 
To this calculus, digital intermediaries can add the goals of avoiding legal regulation 
and streamlining costs. 
This goal assumes that digital intermediaries are media institutions owing the 
same duty to democracy as newspapers and broadcasters, even though they might 
want to consider themselves merely tech companies that are value-neutral.237 This 
proposition is not new. Before social media platforms were common phenomena, 
Professor Stephanie Craft called on large media conglomerates to recognize a duty 
to their audiences (i.e., the public) due in no small part to the notion that the framers 
of the Constitution “thought of the press as an entity whose purpose was not solely 
or even predominantly profit generation, but public service.”238 Similarly, Profes-
sors David Allen and Elizabeth Hindman have argued that media ethics should be 
a concept built on an institutional level, with the key focus of inquiry being how 
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media companies devote their resources to the betterment of society and the fulfill-
ment of democratic ideals.239 
Professor Michael Perkins reminds us that the fundamental difference between 
law and ethics is that the “law sets a minimum standard below which our actions 
must not fall,” while “ethics sets a higher standard to which we ought to aspire.”240 
The legal regimes analyzed here offer some clues as to how platform ethics might 
be conceptualized through distilling moral values from legal principles that balance 
well with one another and lead intermediaries to engage in practices that go beyond 
minimum standards set by law. 
First, platforms should recognize that they are dependent on users, not the other 
way around. In contrast to § 230, intermediary liability regimes in other parts of the 
world tend to impose less immunity to digital intermediaries. Namely, a “social 
theory of responsibility” in which “control capability [over content] implies co-re-
sponsibility” (morally, if not legally, speaking) distinguishes these regions from the 
United States.241 The non-United States regimes view individual citizens as the most 
important stakeholders in a networked economy that thrives on facilitating public 
discourse, but from a different perspective than United States law. 
Generally, these legal regimes tend to view digital intermediaries as being de-
pendent upon individuals, and they acknowledge the fact that digital intermediaries 
commoditize the speech of individuals for profit.242 For example, notions particu-
larly present in the European, Brazilian, and Indian regimes of intermediary liabil-
ity—that platforms have unscrupulous profit motives behind allowing third-party 
content, even some of the most harmful types—should translate into an ethical prin-
ciple that the ability of intermediaries to profit off of individuals ends when that 
profit is steeped in harmful content. Therefore, notions of a duty of care, present in 
all of the regulatory models examined here except § 230, can translate into an ethical 
duty that intermediaries should follow in their relations with users. 
Second, intermediaries should recognize the potential of users’ speech to foster 
deliberative democracy online, and thus they should follow ethical precepts that 
would seek to turn their platforms into spaces where robust public debate can occur 
amid a genuine ethos of trust between users and the intermediaries. Such a position 
would transcend the “aggregational” concept of freedom of expression that plat-
forms currently practice, a concept that fits well with the business model of inter-
mediaries but not with their role in democracy.243 
This second goal stems from the values enshrined particularly in the United 
States’ § 230. Section 230 provides much greater protection for speech than the 
others analyzed here.244 This easy distinction comes from the fact that the foreign 
approaches analyzed involve notice-based liability, whereas notice does not trigger 
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liability under § 230.245 On the other hand, the somewhat paradoxical tradeoff of 
prioritizing the protection of speech on social media platforms is that the law may 
be affording so much protection to these intermediaries that they control more 
speech than § 230 intended. 
Professor Sandra Braman argues that digital intermediaries, in hypocritical and 
self-contradictory fashion, “do not want to be content providers but do want to con-
trol all content,” and that § 230 effectively gives them “control without liability.”246 
Intermediaries seek to be “rewarded for facilitating expression but not liable for its 
excesses.”247 Similarly, Professor Rebecca Tushnet and Professor Dawn Nunziato 
argue that § 230 gives digital intermediaries too much of an incentive to control 
speech.248 The argument goes that if intermediaries are able, under § 230, to proac-
tively remove objectionable content without fear of liability, they will do so to the 
detriment of individuals’ ability to speak freely on these platforms.249 Tushnet ac-
cuses this legal regime of “simultaneously supporting freedom and suppression,”250 
and posits that “if we limit intermediary responsibility . . . we should also limit 
intermediary power to control speech.”251 In other words, digital intermediaries face 
a dilemma under the § 230 regime: they can protect speech and be accused of not 
doing enough to prevent harm, or they can remove harmful content at the request 
of individuals and be accused of not doing enough to protect speech.252 
Third, platforms should act with transparency regardless of what decisions they 
make on governing third-party content. This goal is particularly evident in the South 
African ISPA Code, but it is also present in the Japanese and South Korean provi-
sions requiring intermediaries to notify users who posted infringing content that 
their content was being removed or that their identities were being revealed to the 
alleged victims of the content.253 Even in the rather draconian German Network 
Enforcement Law, the spirit of transparency behind filing records with a govern-
ment agency on how platforms handle unlawful third-party content should live on 
in a conception of platform ethics. 
What would these ethical principles look like in practice? For starters, although 
it might seem that following an ethical policy of mitigating harmful third-party con-
tent would require regular monitoring, I do not propose that platforms adopt the 
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ethical version of the monitoring system that the ECtHR called for in Delfi v. Esto-
nia.254 Rather, a notice-and-takedown regime whereby users submit requests to plat-
forms for removal of harmful content would meet this standard. The practice that 
would take platforms to a higher level of moral action beyond minimum legal re-
quirements for removing content when notified would be for intermediaries to pro-
mote civil and constructive discourse on matters of public concern rather than 
merely delete harmful speech. 
For instance, if a Twitter user tweets something that is racist, and another user 
flags the tweet for takedown, Twitter, if it chooses to remove the tweet, could re-
spond to the user in the following manner: 
We have decided to remove your tweet because several other users found 
its content racist and offensive. Our goal at Twitter is to promote a civil 
and constructive discourse among users. We value your contributions to 
this discourse, and we encourage you to keep tweeting in a way that re-
spects the values of our diverse community. If you believe the tweet was 
removed in error, we invite you respond to the removal and let us know 
why you believe your tweet was valuable to public discourse. 
The next step in the process would be for intermediaries to act transparently 
and pull back the curtain to reveal to users what the process of handling user re-
quests for removal of content looks like. This approach could be based on several 
elements that are steeped in an ethic of due process. Platforms should show users 
the same guides that the employees rely on for taking down content.255 Indeed, Fa-
cebook took this step in April 2018 by releasing to the public the guidelines that 
their content moderators use.256 Platforms should allow the user whose content was 
removed to see, at the very least, how many times their content was flagged. Out of 
concern for the safety for the individuals doing the flagging, it would be best to not 
allow the user to see who flagged his or her content, lest he or she retaliates in some 
way. However, knowing the number of flags would help the user get a sense of the 
severity of his or her content. 
Platforms should also allow users the option to appeal to get the posts rein-
stated. This model would be similar to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s pro-
vision that a user can formally appeal to have their allegedly copyright-infringing 
content be reinstated under the theory that the takedown request was issued in bad 
faith.257 This would give the user the opportunity to critically reflect on his or her 
content to make the case that it should be a part of a social network’s public dis-
course. Facebook also instituted an appeals process for removed content in April 
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2018,258 though it has received criticism for its lack of transparency, which is ironic 
given that the social network had simultaneously revealed its content moderation 
guidelines to the public.259 
Certainly, achieving a more complete ethic of transparency will take some time 
and growing pains. However, scholars are starting to build more sophisticated ideas 
of how to make content governance more transparent. For example, communication 
scholar Tarleton Gillespie has suggested that Facebook and other platforms institute 
a practice that he calls “collective flagging,” whereby data created by users reacting 
to extreme content could be viewed in tandem with that content.260 Gillespie lays 
the foundation for this idea in the notion that this data essentially belong to users, 
because they would create the flags.261 
It is worth noting that the legal regimes that establish a duty of care on inter-
mediaries when they are notified of harmful content go no further in their definitions 
of harm than Smolla’s three categories. Societal-level harms, such as those that are 
potentially caused by fake news, are absent from these laws, although there is no 
reason to believe laws could not be amended to force intermediaries into action on 
such content. As of this writing, none of the laws analyzed here have been amended, 
likely due to the relative recentness of the phenomenon and the lack of certainty as 
to what degree (or even whether) it causes harm.262 In the meantime, intermediaries 
could preempt legal action by setting up what I call a “notice-and-discussion” re-
gime to handle UGC that is based on fake news. This regime is similar to the sce-
nario discussed above in that it would be designed to encourage civil and construc-
tive public discourse. 
For instance, if Uncle John links to a fake news story while making a political 
diatribe on Facebook, Cousin Jane, who knows the story is fake, could notify Face-
book of the presence of the story as a means to prompt Facebook to post a comment 
to Uncle John’s post with evidence demonstrating that the story is fake. The goal 
here would not be to humiliate Uncle John, but rather to supply evidence from a 
“neutral” third party that the story is fake. Furthermore, Facebook’s post could say 
something like the following: 
We appreciate your passion for this issue and your desire to start a conver-
sation about it on Facebook. We encourage you to continue this discussion 
with your friends armed with the appropriate facts about the issue. 
Facebook could then supply Uncle John, and anyone else following the discus-
sion, with links to a wide array of news sites that discuss an issue related to the issue 
at the heart of the fake news story (e.g., an election). The goal of this approach 
would be to stanch the flow of fake news, while not simultaneously cutting off the 
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discussion of important matters of public concern. In other words, the goal is more 
speech based on facts. 
It should be readily apparent that social media platforms want to embrace a 
system of platform ethics, at the very least for prudential reasons. Professor Monroe 
Price and researcher Stefaan Verhulst remind us that ethical principles can help dig-
ital intermediaries “evolve according to changing norms” in our global society.263 
According to Price and Verhulst, ethical principles “neither mirror public opinion 
nor necessarily lag or lead public opinion in terms of cultural norms”; rather, they 
“represent a temporarily agreed upon set of standards which serves as a way-station 
or modus vivendi as new modes of information are distributed.”264 The authors note 
that “[g]reater flexibility can make it easier to respond to changes in technology 
[and] modify expectations and outcomes,” which is especially important in the con-
text of harmful third-party content, “which is culturally diverse and subject to 
changing norms—is better suited to self-regulation.”265 
Furthermore, Price and Verhulst argue that self-regulation via the adoption of 
ethical standards affords intermediaries the “benefit of avoiding state intervention 
in sensitive areas of basic rights.”266 Furthermore, a constant concern of digital in-
termediaries is that they might lose their “coolness” status among their users, lead-
ing users to turn their eyeballs elsewhere.267 The adage that a platform’s competition 
“is just a click away” may be clichéd,268 but its truth lies in the once-popular social 
networking platforms that have since been shuttered, such as MySpace, Friendster, 
and Orkut. Following a set of precepts from platform ethics could help intermedi-
aries at least maintain, or even enhance, their coolness as they seek to engage more 
concertedly and transparently with their users and with their vital role in democracy. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This article examined intermediary liability laws in nine liberal democratic pol-
ities as they pertain to extreme UGC. The findings from this review were applied to 
further build upon the concept of “platform ethics.”269 The debate over what duties 
digital intermediaries have to their users is expanding and maturing.270 It must be 
approached using metaethical theories as well as ethical norms distilled from com-
parative legal analysis. Platform ethics also must be conceptualized vis-à-vis the 
various ways in which platforms affect our lives. Extreme speech is only part of the 
story. Data privacy, advertising, and the facilitation of journalism are also important 
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lenses from which to view platform ethics. Scholars should continue the conversa-
tion in these areas through scholarship that involves legal research as well as ethical 
research, empirical studies as well as normative ones, and adopting domestic ap-
proaches to study as well as comparative. 
As a final note, the discussion on whether the exceptional § 230 should be re-
vised is also still ongoing. This article does not expressly advocate for a position in 
that debate, except to say any amendments that do materialize should not be put 
forth as a kneejerk reaction to the harms social media platforms facilitate against 
both individuals and society. Rather, they should be considered with a full under-
standing of the nature of the harms being facilitated and a high degree of certainty 
that amendments would in fact curb these harms. If platforms have not developed a 
set of sound ethical principles (not unlike those discussed here) to ameliorate these 
harms on their own, then United States lawmakers would be justified in amending 
§ 230 to do so. 
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